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Labor Markets, Rationality, and 
Workers with Disabilities 
Michael Ashley Stein t 
I. 
THE PARADIGM OF RATIONAL MARKET DECISIONS AND 
THE PUZZLE OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES 
Legal theorists with faith in the principles of the neoclassical economic model 
of the labor market assert that antidiscrimination statutes are inefficient and 
unnecessary. They characterize a statute or regulation that preempts an employer's 
considered personal choice and directs that some other applicant be hired or 
promoted as introducing inefficacy into the employment equation. A core belief in 
market rationality also leads these commentators to deny that state regulation of 
hiring decisions can be a corrective policy. Instead, addressing imbalances through 
legislative intercession is seen as a needlessly distributive method that is inferior 
both to allowing labor market dynamics to restore a nondiscriminatory balance, and 
to nonregulative incentives, such as job programs or cost-spreading through the tax 
I 
system. 
As applied by law and economics practitioners, the comprehensive normative 
goal of the neoclassical economic model is to achieve legal regimes whose 
efficiency mirrors those attained in an ideal market of perfectly competitive 
equilibrium. Under this scheme, the term "efficient" (or "pareto efficient") refers 
to the most optimal outcome, or the one having the greatest utility. It is in large 
part differences about how to determine what solutions are efficient that separates 
the various approaches within law and economics.2 Thus, the discipline 
encompasses several distinct strands of thought, including welfare economics,3 
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Michael Wald and David Weisbach for sharing their thoughts on this paper. Gratitude for comments is also due my 
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I. Excellent exegeses are offered in Stewart J. Schwab, The lAw and Economics Approach to Workplace 
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF TilE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997), and 
in RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349, 349-75 (5th ed. 1998). 
2. Duncan Kennedy and Mario Rizzo push this assertion further, contending thai methodological approaches 
can be maneuvered to yield desired outcomes. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641 (1980). 
3. See generally Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, in JOHN EATWELL ET AL., THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE 
WORLD OF EcONOMICS 713 (1998); WELFARE EcONOMICS AND TilE THEORY OF TilE STATE (William J. Baumol ed., 2d 
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Kaldor-Hicks economics,4 wealth-maximizing law and economics,5 feminist law 
and economics,6 behavioral law and economics,7 expressive law and economics,8 
and what may be loosely termed "progressive" law and economics.9 How each 
branch confronts a given inquiry will depend upon the relevance and weight that it 
places on particular preferences as criteria. Thus, Richard Posner's study of gender 
implications in the workplace 10 was considered deficient by Gillian Hadfield for not 
adequately inquiring into the impact that regulations on sexuality have on women's 
role determinations. 11 
With this interpretation of factors that affect efficiency in mind, I now tum to 
the question of how well Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)12 
conforms to the neoclassical economic paradigm. The assumption that informs 
Title I, as well as more traditional prohibitions against discrimination in 
employment, is that imposing these regulations will equalize employment 
opportunities for targeted groups. But empirical studies of post-ADA employment 
effects highlight a phenomenon that is puzzling. Although analyses suggest that 
employing workers with disaLilities can be cost effective, 13 and despite a 
burgeoning economy in which the unemployment rate for most categories of 
workers has plummeted,14 unemployment of working-age individuals with 
disabilities appears not to have similarly diminished. 15 From the point of view of 
ed. 1965). 
4. See generally Allan M. Feldman, Kaldor-Hicks Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 417 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
5. This strand is primarily identified with academicians from the University of Chicago Law School. 
6. This school is identified by the work of Gillian K. Hadfield, cited infra note 11, as well as the works 
featured in the publication FEMINIST EcONOMICS. 
7. See generally Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology, Human Behavior, Behavorial Economics, 
and the Law, 51 V AND. L. REv. 1499 (1998). • 
8. See Robert Cooter, Comment, Expressive Law and Economics, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). 
9. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law And Economics and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE 
L.J. 341 (1988) (presenting a perspective of law and economics including Duncan Kennedy's scholarship as well as the 
"liberal" law and economics of Richard Markovits and Bruce Ackerman that Kennedy criticizes); see also Duncan 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981). 
I 0. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (I 992). 
II. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, I 06 
HARv. L. REv. 479, 499-502 (1992) (book review). In a similar vein, Hadfield takes to task the circular reasoning used 
by those law and economics scholars who explain gender wage differentials by reference to the historical household 
structure without also questioning the existence of this arrangement. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: 
Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1993); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the 
Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Gco. L.J. 583 (1992). 
12. 42 u.s.c. § 12101 (1994). 
13. See discussion infra notes 40-41 and 56-76. 
14. For example, the overall unemployment rate decreased to 4.2%, a 29-year low, for the month of August 
1999. See Unemployment Drops to 4.2 Percent, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22040469. 
15. Two recent studies report that the post-ADA employment rate of workers with disabilities has moderately 
declined relative to that of workers without disabilities. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JosHUA ANGRIST, 
CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION? THE CASE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT (National Bureau 
of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6670, 1998); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (1997) (unpublished mimeograph on file with author). I qualified these results in the 
text because of an ongoing empirical examination of post-ADA employment effects that I am conducting with John J. 
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scholars applying the neoclassical labor market paradigm to Title I, the clearest 
explanation of this phenomenon seems to be that the studies reporting the cost 
effectiveness of employing the disabled are incorrect (even if only overstated). 
Following from this explication is the conclusion that selecting workers with 
disabilities over nondisabled workers is an inefficient practice. 
In this essay, I examine and assess the arguments made by proponents of the 
view that the inefficiency of employing workers with disabilities is a deterrent to 
their inclusion in the labor market. If these arguments are sound, then rational 
market forces appear to be inexorably at work to attenuate the strategy embodied 
by Title I of the ADA. To the contrary, however, I will identify a market failure 
that prevents certain employers from reaching rational labor market decisions by 
creating a "taste for discrimination"16 in which the costs of including people with 
disabilities in a workforce are perceived as being greater than they really are. 
Further, I will propose an improved manner for assessing the efficiency of 
employing workers with disabilities and consider what this method implies 
regarding the rationality of Title I' s strategy. Finally, I will show that the failure of 
the existing neoclassical economic model, as well as the Title I critiques that rely 
on this model, is attributable at least in part to the societal misconceptions about 
people with disabilities that are built into the model's assumptions. 17 That is, far 
from being neutral or objective, these critiques actually sanction and perpetuate the 
very irrational biases the ADA was designed to correct. 18 
II. 
FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS 
The neoclassical economic model of the labor market begins from the premise 
that markets for goods and services operate rationally. As part of this postulate it is 
assumed that markets set their own prices, free bargaining is the norm, and 
knowledge is completely and symmetrically disseminated, resulting in correct end 
values for commodities. Under this theory, market forces discipline employers and 
their self-destructive tastes against particular groups by driving those employers 
from the market. This economic Darwinism occurs because employers' 
discriminatory practices of declining to hire particular types of employees despite 
their greater utility adds to business costs, and thus diminishes their profit margins. 
Exercising distaste also raises the net-product margin of nondiscriminatory 
competitors who engage same-group employees at reduced wage levels. 
Donohue III; see also Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Part Ill: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 271 {2000) (expressing strong 
doubts about the technical accuracy of these studies). 
16. The seminal writing on "distaste" is GARY S. BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-45 {2d ed. 
1971). 
17. Cf Michael Ashley Stein, Design Dynamics of ADA Title I (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
author) (exploring other possible causes for Title I's arrested development). 
18. For an application of this theory in another context, see William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair 
Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. EcON. 507 (1968). 
2000) LABOR MARKETS, RATIONALITY . .. 317 
Resting on this foundation, the neoclassical economic paradigm posits that in 
the context of a rational labor market employers hire workers with the greatest net 
productivity. This utility is calculated by subtracting total labor cost from total 
production benefit. Since workers with disabilities require costly inputs in the form 
of accommodations, an employer, if sufficiently unconstrained so that she can act 
of her own rational preference, would logically choose non-disabled employees. 
The most thorough criticism of Title I from a law and economics perspective 
was published by Richard Epstein after passage of the ADA, but prior to 
promulgation of its regulations. 19 Although therefore somewhat precipitous, 
because successive literature closely follows Epstein's position in applying the 
neoclassical economic labor market model, 20 elucidating his arguments will yield 
an understanding of how those who utilize similar assumptions assess Title e1 For 
facility of reference, these views (with his courteous permission) will be attributed 
directly to Epstein. At the same time, however, my criticisms of Epstein are 
apropos to other law and economics practitioners to the extent that they adopt 
normative assumptions common to the neoclassical economic model, for example 
the belief in an existing rational marketplace for labor services.22 
Epstein advances three main reasons for believing that the potential benefits 
associated with reasonable accommodations are inherently less than the costs they 
engender. First, it is in the nature of disability that those individuals are less 
productive than their able-bodied counterparts. Second, providing 
accommodation-that is, giving a disabled worker something her able-bodied peers 
do not receive as a means of ameliorating her impairments-must be costly. Third, 
the employment of workers with disabilities extracts yet a further cost when co-
workers and customers respond with "awkward" and "unpleasant" feelings, which 
as "preferences should not be blithely condemned as irrational."23 
When employers are forced to hire disabled employees against their own 
considered judgment, these employers are made to internalize costs that they would 
not have otherwise borne. Consequently, according to Epstein, Title I 
19. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
480-94 (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS]. 
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495 (1995); Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 715 (1994-1995); Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a 
Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 48 V AND. L. REv. 391 (1995); Ron A. Vassel, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Cost, 
Uncenainry and Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397 (1994); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Reasonable Accommodation Under The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 
(1991); Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and Dreams for Lawyers?, 
64 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 229 (1990); Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. I (1990). 
21. See FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 19, at 480-94. 
22. I want to stress that I am not imputing Epstein's vision of anti-discrintination laws to all other variations 
within the discipline of law and econontics. The only implication which should be drawn is that publications which 
have so far arisen from the field adopt, in large measure, Epstein's position. 
23. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 19, at 486-87. 
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accommodations are inherently inefficient because they reduce the utility the 
employer is able to achieve. Title I's requirements are also unfair because they 
compel private employers to bear the costs of an inefficient social policy. Epstein 
therefore concludes that the current exclusion of people with disabilities from the 
employment sphere is the result of rational decisionmaking, not of prejudice or 
statistical discrimination. 24 
According to Epstein, a better solution towards achieving the same end of 
altering historical imbalances in the labor market would be to abrogate the ADA so 
as to allow the market to function normally. In this circumstance, employees with 
disabilities could underbid the true value of their services or decline health 
insurance coverage as a way of offsetting their accommodation costs. If necessary, 
the state could create incentives for accommodating disabled workers by spreading 
those costs through the tax structure or by directly issuing vouchers to employers.25 
Finally, Epstein maintains that specific industries and plant locations could be 
chosen as "centers" of accommodation. By concentrating workers with disabilities 
at such sites, there is increased likelihood that physical plant or equipment 
accommodations will see repeated usage. According to Epstein, this last option 
"far from being seen as handicap ghettoization, will be regarded as a sensible effort 
to economize on public funds." 26 
Four principal theoretical flaws undermine Epstein's application of 
neoclassical economic principles to Title I. First, and in tum undermining each of 
the subsequent three postulates, is his unconditional acceptance of the neoclassical 
economic labor market model. This paradigm, far from being neutral, adopts and 
perpetuates many of the same irrational biases the ADA was designed to correct. 
Second, it is assumed that to employ an individual with a disability requires 
significant workplace accommodation. Epstein maintains this conjecture even 
though many accommodations involve only minimal or no cost, and some occasion 
positive benefits. Third, the appraisal presumes that policymakers ought to factor 
in the costs of provoking negative feelings in other employees even when these are 
engendered by biased tastes. That is, Epstein does not introduce any consideration 
to distinguish costs occasioned by behavior influenced by insupportable or 
mistaken beliefs from the costs of justified or sustainable ones. Fourth, the analysis 
is incomplete because Epstein considers only internalized costs associated with 
workplace accommodations, and ignores both concomitant internalized and 
external benefits. 
24. ld. at 487 ("In light of the business realities of the situation, the popular treatment of the disabled cannot 
simply be dismissed as prejudice or bigotry."). 
25. Approbation of grant programs is also shared by commentators advocating on behalf of the disabled. See 
Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding For Disability AccomTTWdations: A Rational Solution to Rational 
Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 197 (1998); Sue A. Krenek, Beyond 
Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969 (1994). An appraisal of these programs is offered in ALBERTO 
MARTINI & SHARON ARNOLD, PROGRAMS PROVIDING SUBSIDIZED EMPLOYMENT TO DISADVANTAGED WORKERS: A 
REVIEW OF THEIR EFFECITVENESS (Mathematica Policy Research Paper No. 7725-400, Feb. 1990). 
26. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 19, at 494. 
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A. Over-Reliance on the Neoclassical Model 
The first flaw in Epstein's account is his unqualified approbation of the 
neoclassical economic model. As set forth above, this paradigm posits that 
employers acting rationally will hire and maintain workers with the greatest net 
productivity, while employees who act irrationally will be disciplined by market 
forces and ultimately driven from competition. This premise, which is taken as a 
standard economic assumption by many law and economics practitioners, has 
questionable factual and normative elements as applied to the reality of disabled 
workers' experiences in the labor market.27 In explaining this assertion, the 
scholarship of Cass Sunstein28 and John Donohue29 is instructive. 
There is a factual objection to applying the neoclassical labor market model to 
disabled workers. To begin with, the standard neoclassical economic model is 
premised on complete and symmetrical distribution of information to all actors 
within a given market. Yet not all markets function equally in this respect. 
Accordingly, although the neoclassical economic account of information 
dissemination might be true of financial markets whose extensive "reporting" 
requirements are rigorously enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
no parallel structure exists in the labor market. Similarly, the liquidity of financial 
market commodities does not extend to the market for employment services, where 
the value of individual workers is difficult to disaggregate. 
Next, contrary to the neoclassical labor market account, empirical studies 
conducted both before and after passage of the ADA clearly demonstrate the 
persistence of employment discrimination as an obstacle to labor market 
opportunities for workers with disabilities.30 In analyzing the effects of employer 
practices, these studies, which assume information asymmetry in the labor market, 
glean the effects of non-statistical (or economically rational) behavior from that 
caused by prejudice. In other words, they separate the consequences of decisions 
arising from the use of indicators which substitute reliable generalizations about 
group characteristics from those which either wrongly assume or overestimate the 
existence of those characteristics. In the case of workers with disabilities, existing 
misconceptions about disabled workers that substitute for less easily obtainable 
accurate information tend to sway estimates of indicators that are meant to signal 
appraisals of productivity and accommodation cost. Additionally, even if 
27. A particularly good treatment of the generally weak predictive value of this model is Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavorial Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
28. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING CNIL RIGHTS 23 (Ellen F. 
Paul et al. eds., 1991). 
29. For two particularly good examples of Donohue's reasoning, see John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex 
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337 (1989); John J. Donohue III, Is 
Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986). 
30. See, e.g., Mrujorie Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (1994); Mrujorie Baldwin et al., Gender Differences in Wage Losses from 
Impairments: Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 865 (1994); 
William G. Johnson & James Lambrinos, Wage Discrimination Against Handicapped Men and Women, 20 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 264 (1985). 
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economically rational indicators were substituted for biased ones, a market failure 
would continue because employers' discriminatory behavior would be rewarded as 
efficient (and conversely, a system requiring economically empowered employers, 
rather than economically disempowered employees, to bear cost differentials 
incurred by disregarding rational economic discrimination may arguably be more 
efficient from a social welfare standpoint). Thus, the baseline assumption that 
employers act in a rational manner while seeking to maximize their own profits 
appears empirically invalid. 
Moreover, the neoclassical economic model asserts that once discriminatory 
practices are observed, employers who exercise distaste are disciplined by market 
forces that reduce their profit margins while increasing those of their 
nondiscriminatory competitors. As with the first premise, this theory has not been 
empirically demonstrated. Indeed, logical application of the neoclassical economic 
paradigm would recount that prior to 1964, when federal antidiscrimination laws 
injected inefficiency into the dynamics governing private employment 
relationships, discriminatory firms would have been either penalized or driven from 
competition. I am unaware of any empirical evidence that supports this position. 
To the contrary, United States markets have historically evinced various forms of 
unpunished discriminatory behavior. Consequently, there is no proof for a belief in 
the self-corrective force of competitive market pressures in the labor field. 
There is also a normative objection to utilizing neoclassical economic 
principles to examine the dynamics of disabled participation in the labor market. 
Accepting this paradigm would not discipline irrational behavior and restore the 
employment market to a nondiscriminatory equilibrium. Instead, reliance on 
competitive pressure as advocated in neoclassical economic analyses would 
perpetuate market failure by reinforcing the stereotypes Title I was meant to 
counteract. This is because the neoclassical economic paradigm uses as its baseline 
a status quo designed by an empowered majority that has already absorbed existing 
prejudices and made them endogenous to future decision making. Hence, any 
analysis that assumes market neutrality has reflexively erected obstacles to 
antidiscrimination principles that are entrenched in the same stereotypes those civil 
rights statutes seek to alter. Whether embracing these stereotypes is an 
unconscious,31 semi-conscious,32 conscious,33 or cognitively biased34 decision 
31. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (offering two different psychological explanations for unconscious racism). 
32. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1358-59 (1988) (arguing that in addition to 
unconscious thought, racism forms a hegemonic force in American society, one in which blacks have been created as a 
subordinated "other"). 
33. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A 
Critical Review of Supreme Coun Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (asserting that civil rights statutes are 
actually used by the white majority to legitimate the very racial inequality and oppression they were meant to remedy). 
34. An especially perceptive approach is Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opponunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995), which argues 
that many prejudiced employment-based decisions arise from unintentional categorization-related decision errors rather 
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remains hotly debated, as does the issue of whether preferences are fixed35 or 
malleable.36 For now, however, it is sufficient to say that accepting the neoclassical 
economic model's view that existing prejudicial preferences built into the 
marketplace are neutral will only serve to continue those stereotypes. 
Within the context of Epstein's Title I analysis, propagation of disability-
related biases would result from his recommendation that deference be paid to the 
distastes of both third parties and employers, even under a regime in which the 
ADA was itself abrogated. In the case of third-party distaste, whether arising from 
co-workers or customers, market pressure will foster, rather than eliminate, 
discrimination. This is because the inclusion of third party distaste into the 
efficiency equation will necessarily cause employers to factor into their decisions 
the very prejudices that Title I endeavors to avoid. Furthermore, it would be 
unusual, from a methodological standpoint, to defer to preferences of nonmarket 
third-party actors. 
As for employers, Epstein's claim that workers with disabilities could either 
underbid the value of their services or forego health insurance benefits as a way of 
capturing accommodation costs would, if heeded, also perpetuate market failure. 
Working for lower remuneration or benefits might indeed be an inducement for 
nondiscriminatory employers to engage workers with disabilities. However, it 
would also reinforce the devaluation of those individuals beget by unfounded 
stereotypes, and so continue market failure. Acceding to employers' distastes by 
bribing them through reduced compensation also reduces whatever social good and 
external benefits can arise from equal pay and occupational dignity. In addition, 
because the prospect of recovering the cost of education and training is influenced 
by prevailing market conditions, disabled individuals will lose utility as a result of 
their reduced willingness to invest in their own human capital. Finally, the loss of 
health care coverage is considered a major disincentive for disabled workers to 
leave public assistance programs and enter the workplace. 37 This is underscored by 
the fact that Congress recently voted to extend the length of time preceding the 
cutoff of these benefits following gainful employment. 38 Thus, having workers with 
disabilities bargain away insurance coverage as a means of increasing labor markei: 
participation would only further sustain an existing market failure. 
than intentionally discriminatory motivations. 
35. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. EcoN. REv. 76 
(1977). 
36. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZJONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988). 
37. See Mrujorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AAPSS 37 (1997); 
Richard V. Burkhauser, Post·ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS AAPSS 37, 71 
(1997). Pre-ADA assessments addressing the same issue include JERRY L. MASHAW & VmGINIA P. RENo, DISABILITY, 
WORK AND CASH BENEFITS (1989), MONROE BERKOWITZ & M. ANNE HILL, DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET: 
EcONOMIC PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS (1986), and JONATHAN S. LEONARD, LABOR SUPPLY INCENTIVES AND 
DISINCENTIVES FOR THE DISABLED (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 1174, 1985). 
38. See Robert Pear, Senate Approves Health Care for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A28; Testimony 
Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, Health, Education, 
and Human Services Division). 
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B. Miscalculating Productivity 
The second systemic flaw in Epstein's account is his tripartite assumption 
that because disabled employees are by nature less productive than their non-
disabled counterparts, they require accommodations, and that these 
accommodations are inherently costly. Empirical studies have not established the 
prevalence of the need for accommodation among disabled workers across the 
labor market. It is reasonable to assume that some percentage of employees with 
disabilities will require accommodations. The size of this group will depend upon 
the individual circumstances of present or prospective employees, the degree to 
which an employer's worksite and processes are already accessible, and how the 
term "disabled" is conceived39 or measured.40 There is, however, no reason to 
suspect that every employee with a disability requires an accommodation, and 
counterexamples to any such broad generalization are abundant. 
Moreover, although the area needs greater and more representative study,41 
available empirical data suggest that accommodating workers with disabilities 
engenders little or no cost. For example, a study examining 500 accommodations 
made by Sears, Roebuck & Co. over the twenty-year period 1978-96 found that 
nearly all of the accommodations were made at minimal cost.42 Results of the Sears 
Study are corroborated by those of the Job Accommodation Network, which 
reported the typical cost of accommodation as $200,43 and by other appraisals 
showing similarly moderate costs.44 Another analysis concluded that the cost of 
39. A recent and peninent example is the limitation upon the use of mitigating measures in detemtining 
disability expressed by the Supreme Coun in their recent troika of decisions. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 
U.S._, I 19 S. Ct 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S._, 119 S.Ct 2133 (1999); Albensons, 
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). Justice O'Connor's numerical discussion in Sutton is 
particularly illuminating. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2142. 
40. Estimated by Congress to be 43 million at the time of the ADA's passage, see 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (1994), 
recent appraisals are as high as 55 million. See U.S. Census. Current Population Survey ("CPS" (visited Feb. 20, 
2000), available at <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/disabcps.html>. See generally Albeno Martini, Why 
Estimates of the Number of Persons with Disabilities Who Want to Work Diverge so Widely (Mathematica Policy 
Research Paper No. 7984-001) (May 1991); SAAD Z. NAG!, THE CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT OF DISABILITY IN 
DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS I (Edward D. Berkowitz, ed. 1979). 
41. "Adequate economic data examining the effect of the population of young, qualified persons with 
disabilities able to join the work force is not available." Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic 
Opportunity, and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from /990-/993, 79 IOWA L. REv. 853, 918 
(1994); see also Frederick C. Collignon, Is the ADA Successful? Indicators for Tracking Gains, 549 ANNALS AAPSS 
129 (1997); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 6 
(1996). 
42. Specifically, from 1978-92, the average out-of-pocket expense for an accommodation was $121; from 1993-
96, that average dropped to $45. From January I, 1993 to December 31, 1995, 72% of accommodations required no 
cost, 17% carried an expenditure of less than $100, 10% cost less than $500, and 1% required outputs of between $500-
$1,000. See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILfTIES ACT, TRANSCENDING 
COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND Co. 17 (Annenberg Washington Program 
Publication, 1996) [hereinafter SEARS STUDY]. 
43. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILfTIES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (July 26, 1995) (visited Feb. 20, 2000), available at <http:// 
www .jan. wvu.edu/english/congress.httn >. 
44. See, e.g., Laura Koss-Feder, Spurred by the Americans with Disabilities Act, More Firms take on Those 
Ready, Willing and Able to Work, TIME MAG., Jan. 25, 1999, at 82A (citing James Geletka, Executive Director of the 
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accommodating disabled workers was equal to that of acclimating nondisabled 
workers.45 Nevertheless, the fact that these studies report the activities of only a 
minority of corporations, when similar practices would compel more widely spread 
efficient corporate planning, evidences a market failure. 
Lastly, it is not accurate to assume that disabled workers are by nature less 
productive than their counterparts free of disabilities, although this may be true for 
some individuals with disabilities, just as some nondisabled workers are less 
productive than the majority of disabled ones. In terms of statutory protection, a 
disabled worker is not considered "qualified" under Title I unless she can perform 
the essential job functions of her chosen occupation, either with or without 
accommodation. A disabled employee who satisfies the requirements of her 
position without accommodation is equally as productive as her non-disabled peers. 
When she needs accommodations to accomplish integral activities, the existence 
and degree of her relatively lower net productivity is affected by her ability to 
accomplish nonessential job functions, as well as the value of those supplementary 
services to her employer.46 It bears noting, however, that forty years of pre-ADA 
empirical studies indicate comparable overall productivity levels between disabled 
and non-disabled workers.47 For example, statistics from the U.S. Office of 
Vocational Rehabilitation indicate that 91% of disabled workers were rated either 
"average" or "better than average," the same rating given to non-disabled 
workers.48 Judging from the shortage of disability awareness49 and management 
programs50 instituted by corporations as part of their business practices, human 
resource managers seem unaware of this information. This scarcity further denotes 
an information asymmetric; under a neoclassical economic model, companies with 
access to this information would act on these favorable economic incentives and 
Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology Society of America for the proposition that most workplace 
accommodations cost less than $200); PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE EMERGING ROLE OF TilE STAFFING INDUSTRY IN TilE 
EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A CASE REPORT ON MANPOWER INC. 7 (Annenberg Washington Program 
Publication, 1998) (reporting that accommodation costs were "minimal") [hereinafter MANPOWER]; Rita Thomas Noel, 
Employing the Disabled: A How and Why Approach, 44 TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT J. 26, 31 (1990) (reporting that 
about 80% of accommodations cost less than $500). 
45. See LoUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE lCD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS (1987) 
(conducted for the National Organization on Disability). 
46. Thus, the ADA is not affirmative action in the sense of requiring the preferential hiring of less or nearly 
qualified workers. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, The ( R)evolution of Physical Disability Anti-discrimination Law: 
1976-1996, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 613 (1996). 
47. The literature is reviewed in Reed Greenwood & Virginia Anne Johnson, Employer Perspectives on 
Workers with Disabilities, 53 J. REHABILITATION 37 (1987). 
48. See Rick A. Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEY. J. 
50-51 ( 1987); George E. Stevens, Exploding the Myths About Hiring the Handicapped, 63 PERSONNEL 57, 59 ( 1986). 
49. See, e.g., JOHN G. VERES III & RONALD R. SIMS, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, cbs. 8-9 (1995); SHEILA H. AKABAS ET AL., DISABILITY MANAGEMENT (1992); FRANK BOWE & 
lAY ROCHLIN, THE BUSINESS-REHABILITATION PARTNERSHIP: AN ARKANSAS REHABILITATION AND RESEARCH 
TRAINING CENTER PROJECT (1983); JACK R. ELLNER & HENRY E. BENDER, HIRING TilE HANDICAPPED: AN AMACOM 
RESEARCH STUDY (1980). 
50. See THE ADA AT WORK: lMPLEMENTATION OF TilE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF TilE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT: A STUDY BY SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1999). 
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promote greater employment among the disabled. 
C. Weighting Distaste 
A third systemic flaw in the Epstein view is its account of co-worker and 
client distaste when calculating the costs of employing people with disabilities. 
Although law and economics assessments are expected to account for all possible 
costs and benefits when assessing efficiency, it is atypical when calculating social 
good to give weight to preferences arising from socially undesirable criteria (for 
example, illegal tastes).51 Consequently, deferring to prejudicial irrationalities 
about disabled workers is a controversial method of applying conventional law and 
economics criteria. Such inclusion would also result, as was shown above, in 
continuation of the same biases that Title I was meant to counteract. At the very 
least, Epstein needs to justify such atypical accession to irrational preferences. 
Furthermore, his focus on disability as the exclusive cause of distaste felt by one 
worker for another posits a depth of ignorance about human· reactions, as well as 
the kind of information void that Epstein claims does not exist in a rational 
workplace. 
An information asymmetry also exists as to the distastes of employers and 
third parties towards workers with disabilities. While empirical surveys of Fortune 
500 executives,52 senior executives,53 and co-workers54 uniformly report favorable 
attitudes to employing disabled individuals, available data fails to evince significant 
increases in the relative employment rate among disabled individuals. Two 
alternative conclusions can be drawn from this apparent paradox: either cognitive 
dissonance causes the individuals surveyed to believe they favor disabled 
employment when in reality they do not, or those interviewed truly do espouse pro-
disabled sentiments, but because of an information asymmetry this preference does 
not manifest itself when these individuals act aggregately as corporations. 
51. In addition to Epstein, one article averred that additional externalities, all negative, should be considered at 
greater length when weighing the reasonableness of Title I accommodations. See Jason Zarin, Note, Beyond the Bright 
Line: Consideration of Externalities, the Meaning of Undue Hardship, and the Allocation of the Burden of Proof Under 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 7 S. CAL. iNTERDIS. L. J. 511 (1998). This distaste is addressed on a 
sociological level in Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 PoL'Y 
STUD. J. 551 (1987). 
52. See Joel M. Levy et a!., Attitudes of Executives in Fortune 500 Corporations Towards the Employability of 
Persons with Severe Disabilities: Industrial and Service Corporations, 24 J. APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING 19-
31 (1994). 
53. A 1995 survey of senior corporate executives found that 89% supported plans to increase the number of 
workers with disabilities their companies employed. See LoUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY 
ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 24 (1995) (conducted for the National Organization on Disability). 
54. In a 1991 survey, 68% of those polled said they would support policies that increase the number of disabled 
workers, 65% responded that they would not have any problems with disabled co-workers, and 77% said they would 
not be concerned if their boss was a seriously disabled person. See LoUis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, PuBLIC AITITUDES 
TOWARDS PEOPLE wrrn DISABILITIES 13 (1991) (conducted for the National Organization on Disability). 
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D. Ignoring Concurrent Benefits 
Fourth, in assessing the efficiency of Title I accommodations, Epstein focuses 
exclusively on costs affecting individual employers and does not take into account 
benefits that positively impact the statute's efficiency.55 The three main costs that 
Epstein associates with Title I are set forth above: (1) disabled employees are 
naturally less productive than their able-bodied counterparts, (2) workers with 
disabilities therefore require accommodations, and (3) providing accommodations 
engenders great expenses, including negative externalities. However, a balanced 
and complete analysis of Title I should also take into account positive benefits-
both those directly internalized and those arising through externalities-that impact 
disabled employment. The fact that economic analyses have not yet realized the 
existence of counterweighing factors, some of which are set forth in the next 
section, further illustrates the existence of an informational market failure. 
III. 
THE UTILITY OF EMPLOYING WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES 
There are positive external benefits to consider when assessing the potential 
economic effect of a disabled worker on a given firm. These externalities are not 
all readily quantifiable. Considering the impact of these benefits will not result in 
all accommodations being seen as economically efficient, but should render a more 
balanced calculus. 56 
The most immediately quantifiable benefits are those internalized by 
employers due to savings in recruitment, training, and replacement expenses. 57 One 
federally funded agency found that for every dollar spent on accommodation, 
companies saved an average of fifty dollars in net benefits.58 Another survey 
reported that 60% of disabled workers remained with their job placement as 
opposed to only 40% of able-bodied workers, and that the average cost of each job 
turnover was $2,800.59 Moreover, empirical evidence corroborates that workers 
with disabilities have absenteeism rates equal to or lower than their nondisabled 
55. For instance, for individuals aged 16 to 64, the Census reported that the overall employment rate of people 
with disabilities improved 0.3 percentage points during the period 1991-94, rising from 52.0% in 1991 to 52.3% in 
1994. See Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second 
Generation Civil Rights Statute in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS wrrn DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN 
LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000). 
56. See Michael Ashley Stein, Law & Economics and ADA Title I Accommodation Costs (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author) (addressing how the efficiency of accommodation costs might be measured). 
57. See generally Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345 (1997); Peter David Blanck, The Economics of 
the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I- Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 887 (1997). 
58. See President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK 
REPoRTS 10 (1994); see also James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health Histories of Current 
Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 83, 86 (1993) (describing how 
one company saved $4 million, and another $310,000 annually, by providing necessary accommodations). 
59. See MANPOWER, supra note 44, at 29 (1998); AKABAS ET AL., supra note 49, at 261. 
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peers.60 The rational economics of hiring workers with disabilities is also validated 
61 by anecdotal accounts. 
In addition, according to Peter Blanck, many accommodations produce 
desirable "ripple effects."62 Among such desirable consequences are higher 
productivity,63 greater dedication,64 better identification of qualified candidates for 
promotion,65 fewer insurance claims, reduced post-injury rehabilitation costs,66 
improved corporate culture,67 and more widespread use of available technologies.68 
Among the external benefits to employers that are less immediately 
quantifiable are public cost savings, including reduction of disability-related public 
assistance obligations estimated at $120 billion annually.69 Hiring people with 
60. See, e.g., Gretchen Adams-Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Janitorial Workers with 
Mental Retardation and Their Non-Disabled Peers on Retention and Absenteeism, 62 J. REHABILITATION 56 (1996); 
Dolores Ondusko, Comparison of Employees with Disabilities and Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, 22 
J. OF APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING 19-24 (1991); Rick A. Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped 
Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT J. 50-51 (1987); J.E. Martin et a!., Work Attendance in 
Competitive Employment: Comparison between Employees Who Are Non-Handicapped and Those Who Are Mentally 
Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142-47 (1985). 
61. For example, Shelley Donald Coolidge, Fewer With Disabilities at Work Since Passage of Civil Rights Act, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Economy Section), Mar. 7, 1995 at I, describes the experience of Carolina Fine Snacks 
which provided pork skins to the 1992 GOP convention. Prior to hiring a disabled worker, the company had an 80% 
turnover rate and a 20% absenteeism rate. With more than half the company's workers now having a disability, there 
exists almost no absenteeism, and the turnover rate has been reduced to 5%. Id. 
62. See MANPOWER, supra note 44, at 29. 
63. See Patricia M. Owens, Employee Disabilities Needn't Impair Profits, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22 
("Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do attitude for employees with impairments is good for profits and 
productivity."); see also Greyhound Employs Bethphage Industries for Mailing, PR Newswire, Aug. 19, 1998; Jill 
Leovy, Despite Law, Jobs Are Scarce for Disabled, L.A. TiMEs, Mar. 20, 1995, at AI; AKABAS ET AL., supra note 49, 
at260. 
64. See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, With Help From New Technology, More Disabled Join the Work Force, L.A. 
TiMEs, Oct. 25, 1998 at C5 (quoting Jon Irvin, EarthLink's President, as saying that "What you find are employees who 
probably are more focused and more dedicated to doing quality work."); see also John King, Commercial Support 
Services Helps Special Workers Gain Sense of Dignity, Independence, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 1998, at AI?; Stacy Lam, 
Business Win [sic] Awards for Inclusive Hiring, MACON TELEGRAPH, Oct. 7, 1998, at 6; Kathryn Moss, Point-
Counterpoint: American Disabilities Act Statute Brings Better Lives to Thousands, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, Aug. 17, 
1997, at 5. 
65. See Thomas W. Hale et al., Persons with Disabilities: Labor Market Activity I994, MONTHLY LAB. REv., 
Sept. 1998, at 3 (relating that the disabled are less likely to work in high-paying positions relative to non-disabled); cf 
David Chamy & Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments. and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment 
Discrimination Law for "High Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (1998) (finding that current anti-
discrimination laws are largely ineffective in altering employers' behavior in promotion to "high level" jobs, thus 
causing employees subject to discrimination to alter their goals, and resulting in under-investment in human capital). 
66. SEARS STUDY, supra note 42, at 16-17. 
67. Id. 
68. See Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II: 
Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 9, 85-89 (1998). 
69. See DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING DISABILITY POLICY I (Institute of Industrial Relations Working Paper 
No. 65, 1997). One report estimated that for every one million disabled people employed, there would be as much as a 
$21.2 billion annual increase in earned income, a $2.1 billion decrease in means-tested cash income payments, a $286 
million annual decrease in the use of food slamps, a $1.8 billion decrease in Supplemental Security Income payments, 
284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare. See Patricia Digh, People with 
Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HR MAG., June 1998, at 144 (citing Rutgers economist Douglas Kruse). 
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disabilities has also been shown to be beneficial to taxpayers' burdens70 and the 
national economy.71 These economic benefits, which were clearly a Congressional 
concern when passing the ADA,72 are recognized by a minority of companies.73 
Finally, intangible benefits also flow from the extension of employment 
sphere protection to disabled individuals. Although the effects of such protections 
upon individual employers are more difficult to quantify, these advantages may 
nonetheless maximize the collective good. These benefits include placing people 
with disabilities in a position to exercise all the responsibilities of citizenship/4 
acknowledging that capable individuals have a "right" to work,75 permitting the 
disabled to achieve dignity through labor and productivity,76 and realizing the value 
of a diverse society.77 The value of these gains, as well as what any of them is 
worth to individual employers, is not necessarily negligible even if it is unclear. 
The expenses extracted for achieving these benefits must therefore be closely 
evaluated in any determination of whether to place such costs upon employers 
rather than spread them through taxes or other state-governed devices. 
Nevertheless, employers arguably benefit individually from a collective climate in 
which citizens value the identities they achieve from being productive more than 
they do the relief of being excused from productivity. 
How and when to allocate the costs of maintaining a culture of productivity 
raises a host of issues, including criticisms of those law and economics studies 
utilizing wealth as a value,78 the continuing debate surrounding commodificiation,79 
questions about the perspective of policymakers,80 and differences of opinion on the 
70. See NISH, THE JWOD PROGRAM: PROVIDING COST SAVINGS TO TilE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BY EMPLOYING 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITiES (Feb. 6, 1998) (reporting that the federal government saved $1,963,206 annually by 
employing 270 people with disabilities); CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF REHABILITATION MENTAL HEALTH COOPERATIVE 
PROGRAMS, TAXPAYER RETURN STUDY (Oct. 1995) (finding that for every disabled person employed, California 
taxpayers saved an average of $625/month in costs). 
71. See Thomas N. Chirakos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the United States: A Preliminary 
Assay, 67 MILBANK Q. 59 (1989). 
72. "By giving people the opportunity to become self-sufficient we ase ... decreasing the asnount of Federal 
money being spent to support individuals with disabilities and increasing tax revenue." 136 CONG REc. S9684, 9688 
(1990) (statement of Senator Durenberger); see also S. REP. No. IOI-116, at 16-17 (1990); 136 CONG. REc. 
S9684,9688 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 4 (1989). 
73. See IMPLEMENTATION OF TilE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF TilE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A 
SURVEY OF TilE WASHINGTON BUSINESS GROUP ON HEALTH (Apr. 1999) (showing that 42% of companies surveyed 
realized these economic benefits). 
74. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-101 (1991). 
75. See Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 262 (1992). 
76. See Mask C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People 
with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REv. 123, 129 (1998). 
77. See Elizabeth Clask Morin, Note, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through 
Employment, 40 CArn. U.L. REV. 189, 194-195 (1990). 
78. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND TilE LAW (1988); Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
227 (1980). 
79. See generally Richasd Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1419 (1998). 
80. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND 
EcONOMICS 3 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1998); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL 
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advantages of investing in human capital.81 Regardless of how these issues are 
resolved, an account that educates both employers and economists about some of 
the difficult-to-quantify benefits listed above is far more consistent with our 
traditional thinking about the personal and social value of productivity than a 
narrow construction of social motivation which it assumes, counterfactually, that 
the statute "would not be necessary if these [accommodations] were beneficial to 
employers, as they automatically act in ways that promote their self interests."82 
IV. 
MARKET FAILURE AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
In this section I show why disability can evoke irrational market behavior with 
respect to employment. The assertion of market failure within the employment 
relationship is not unique. Econometric,83 economic,84 and civil rights85 sources 
have all given rise to claims that imperfect information undermines the rationality 
of hiring decisions. Additionally, there is an ongoing debate86 over the issue of 
whether and when to characterize decisions made in the context of imperfect 
information based on "indicators" believed to evaluate future performance as 
statistical (and discriminatory)87 or rational (and predictive).88 There are also 
examples of employers failing to capitalize on other economically beneficial 
actions, 89 which would happen as a matter of course under an application of the 
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 117 ( 1996). 
81. Compare Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. EcON. 9 (1970), 
with Rulh Calker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting 
Responsibilities under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEM. 213 (1997). For an international perspective, see 
CLEMENT FuEST & BERND HUBER, WHY DO COUNfRIES SUBSIDIZE INvEsTMENT AND NOT EMPLOYMENT? (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6685, 1998), and RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE OF 
HYPERCAPITALISM (1997). 
82. Thomas H. Barnard, Disabling America: Costing Out the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 CORNELL J.L. 
& PuB. POL'Y 41, 58 (1992). 
83. See, e.g., Marjorie Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. REsOURCES I (1994); Marjorie Baldwin et al., Gender Differences in Wage Losses from 
Impairments: Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 29 J. HUM. REsOURCES 865 (1994); 
William G. Johnson & James Lambrinos, Wage Discrimination Against Handicapped Men and Women, 20 J. HUM. 
REsOURCES 264 ( 1985). 
84. See, e.g., DAVID NEUMARK, LABOR MARKET INFORMATION AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BY RACE AND SEX 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6573, 1998); Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop 
Discrimination, supra note 28. 
85. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination 
A Blind A/ley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV 215 (1998); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE 
OF RACISM (1992). 
86. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. EcON. REv. 228 (1986). 
87. See generally Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977). 
88. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513,516 
(1987). 
89. For instance, high efficiency electrical equipment available lhrough negawatt acquisition programs. See 
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. 
Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1359-1361 (1993). 
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neoclassical economic labor market model. 
The neoclassical economic model that informs Epstein's analysis has a 
theoretical error in that it incorporates market failure by reproducing two societal 
informational flaws about people with disabilities. First, there is the focus on 
disability as causing reactions that may be ecumenically human. Second, the 
model imposes a medical rather than a social account of disability. Acceptance of 
these paired misapprehensions is occasioned by a pervasive lack of accurate 
knowledge about people with disabilities, and further exacerbated by the distinctive 
chronicle of their civil rights empowerment. That these fallacies continue to exist, 
even to the extent that they are diffused through scholarly discourse, underscores 
the need for raising social consciousness about Americans with disabilities. This 
information must be disseminated if market failure is to be corrected. 
Epstein's view on Title I incorporates society's perception that disability is 
central to determinations which can also be universally human. One example is the 
positing of awkward feelings which, it is imagined, will be engendered in non-
disabled individuals who have to interact in a work situation with a disabled 
worker. These feelings could arise when either customers or co-workers have not 
yet been enculturated to disability. Nevertheless, the ways in which a worker 
approaches her job-for instance, her personality and demeanor-are factors 
irrespective of disability that ultimately determine the comfort of interaction. To 
illustrate, an able-bodied sadist would function poorly in a customer relations 
department and associate poorly with peers because of his conduct rather than his 
physical differences. Similarly, we may expect that, ultimately, the rational 
responses of others will be influenced by whether individuals with disabilities 
conduct themselves in the ways that disagreeable people without disabilities do, or 
whether they behave agreeably. 
Additionally, reacting negatively to the difference of disability is not 
inherently different from parallel historic responses by the dominant majority to the 
exclusion of other groups: for instance, a patient's discovery that not all doctors are 
male and that he is about to be examined by a woman urologist; or that for the first 
time in your life the professor who will determine your course grade, and perhaps 
your future career, is a person of color. As for distaste, one of the (now discarded) 
arguments for failing to offer women equitable career opportunities in police 
positions was the distaste expressed by officers' wives at the thought of their 
husbands spending long hours in a patrol car in the company of other women. If 
third-party distaste had influenced assessments of that statute's efficacy, the 
antidiscrimination measure would have been undermined by the same prejudices it 
sought to remedy. 
It is also inaccurate to suppose that the ADA differs wholly from other civil 
rights statutes, and is uniquely expensive in that it compels accommodations. 
Requiring changes of practice or environment in order to function optimally, even 
when not economically efficient, is not exclusive to the disabled. Famously, the 
inclusion of women in most parts of the military workforce required expenditures 
to increase inventoried uniforms and equipment. Members of both genders under 
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the Family Medical Leave Act,90 and members of certain religious groups under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),91 are legally entitled to forms of 
accommodation.92 To varying degrees, all civil rights integration involves 
expenditures.93 Moreover, because of standard business practice dynamics, workers 
can regularly receive various kinds of accommodations that are unrelated to any 
recognized civil right. 94 
Epstein's analysis also mirrors a perspectival flaw of mainstream society by 
implicitly adopting a "medical model" of disability.95 Under a medicalized account 
of disability, people with disabilities are cast in two alternative, yet dichotomous 
roles: the pitiable poster child and the inspirational "supercrip."96 The pitiable 
poster child is an image created to inspire the exercise of charity by instilling 
potential donors with pity for unfortunate children. Because of its emotional 
appeal, the cute and courageous poster child who smiles through his or her "tragic" 
fate is the most beloved American symbol of disability. The flip side of the pitiable 
poster child is the supercrip. If science, supported by telethon money, can not cure 
the scourge of disability, then society demands the disabled to cure themselves 
through hard work, determination, and pluck.97 The medical model heavily 
influenced legislation passed in the earlier part of the century, especially those 
statutes stressing vocational rehabilitation as a means of "overcoming" disability 
through productive employment. One notable example is the post-World War I 
Smith-Sears Act which mandated vocational rehabilitation programs in an attempt 
to ameliorate disabling war injuries.98 
In contrast to the medical model, the social model-also sometimes called the 
civil rights or minority model-tracks the empowerment movements of the 1950s 
and 1960s which sought to eradicate discrimination posited on the biological 
90. 29 u.s.c. § 2601 (1994). 
91. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16,78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1994)). 
92. Some would extend this assertion to women under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See generally Peter 
David Blanck & Corinne R. Butkowski, Pregnancy-Related Jmpainnents and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 25 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS OF N. AM. 435 (1998); Samuel lsaacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the 
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUMB. L. REv. 2154 (1994). 
93. For example, the parallel costs incurred by a desegregated all-white firm losing clients and members, a 
formerly all-male corporation having to build womens' restroom facilities, or a uniformly (acknowledged) heterosexual 
company extending benefits to same-sex partners. 
94. For instance, allowing a parent to attend his daughter's soccer match. 
95. See generally RICHARD BRYANT TREANOR, WE OVERCAME: THE STORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS FOR DISABLED 
PEOPLE (1993); CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CoNSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE ROOTS (1988). 
96. The term "supercrip" is used by Joseph P. Shapiro in NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILmES FORGING A NEW 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12-16 (1993). What follows is drawn from SHAPIRO at 12-16 and from Michael Ashley 
Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowennent of Americans With Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 247, 249-
52 (1994). 
97. See SHAPIRO, supra note 96; Stein, supra note 96. 
98. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. 617 (1919). A work still in progress 
that promises to break new ground is Peter David Blanck, Civil War Pensions, Civil Rights, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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differences of blacks and women.99 According to this account, inequalities foisted 
upon the disabled because of their exclusion from social interaction (including 
work) have been the result of socially constructed practices rather than the 
outgrowth of natural phenomena. Ioo For example, architectural constructions which 
exclude a portion of the population, as in restrooms which are not accessible to 
wheelchair users, may be viewed as a "natural" condition by the majority non-
disabled class. Yet, because there is no absolute reason why a "universal design" 
which can give access to a restroom for all users should not equally be the norm, 
the social model perceives the distinction as artificial and the result of an unjust 
social arrangement. 
The ADA (as well as other legislation affecting people with disabilities) was 
promulgated in large measure to level a playing field which historically had 
discriminated against people with disabilities by imposing medicalized 
stereotypes. IOI In assessing Title I, Epstein asserts that social policy affecting 
people with disabilities should be driven by philanthropic benevolence. As stated 
by Epstein, "[h]aving a disability is the source of an enormous level of personal 
loss" leading to "sympathies" that "tug knowingly at the heartstrings" and inspire 
"charitable giving and charitable services."102 It is because people with disabilities 
are worthy of sympathy that subsidizing their inferior work productivity is 
considered altruistic. 103 Thus, those following Epstein's perspective adopt the 
medical model's assumption that disability entails dependence, rather than the 
social model's rights-based presupposition that disability does not defeat an 
individual's entitlement to self-determination. By adopting the medical model into 
the calculus of what is rational, Epstein and neoclassical economists continue the 
methods and mythologies that the ADA was intended to cure.I04 
99. See Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The 
Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 516-521 (1998). 
100. See generally COLIN BARNES, GEOF MERCER & TOM SHAKESPEARE, EXPLORING DISABILITY: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION (1999); MARY KLAGES, WOEFUL AFFLICTIONS; DISABILITY AND SENTIMENTALITY IN 
VICTORIAN AMERICA (1999); HERBERT C. COVEY, SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS OF PEOPLE Wffil DISABILITIES IN HISTORY 
(1998). 
10 I. Specifically, Congress enacted the ADA as a remedy to the continuing pattern "of unfair and unnecessary 
discrimination and prejudice" which denied "people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and 
to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(9) (1994). 
102. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 19, at 486. 
103. On the social construction of disability and the expectations that are therefore engendered, see Matthew 
Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996); 
M. Ronald Buckley eta!., Perceptions of Inequity in Performance Appraisal Resulting From the Implementation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, in HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE ADA 105-14 (John G. Veres III & 
Ronald R. Sims eds., 1995); H. McDonough, Hiring People with Disabilities, 37 SUPERVISORY MANAGEMENT II 
(1992). 
104. The practical consequences of the contrast are nicely captured in William G. Johnson, The Future of 
Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights?, 549 ANNALS AAPSS 160 (1997). 
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v. 
CHRONOLOGY OF CIVIL EMPOWERMENT 
Unlike other marginalized minority groups, disabled Americans were 
empowered by civil rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social 
consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities. 105 In brief, 106 efforts to 
achieve the ADA's passage helped transform parallel but uncoordinated efforts of 
disability-specific advocacy groups and individuals to a unified disability rights 
movement. 107 Formerly, groups representing many different disabilities promoted 
their own issues and concerns. For instance, the massive and unyielding protest by 
students for appointment of a deaf president at Gallaudet University, a higher 
learning institution for the hearing impaired, 108 was entirely unconnected to the 
advocacy of developmentally disabled constituency of People First, which sought 
both integration into mainstream society and greater control for its members over 
the structure of their own lives. 109 In addition, disability rights groups often clashed 
with one another. For instance, the curb cuts fought for by wheelchair-users were 
opposed by some visually impaired people whose method of distinguishing 
between sidewalk and roadway WaS tO locate the CUrb tactilely .110 
The campaign for the ADA brought these fragmented organizations 
together. 111 However, because the history of disability rights advocacy is largely 
one of uncoordinated activity among disparate specifically concerned groups, 
people with disabilities, unlike other minority groups, have not acknowledged a 
single nationally recognized leadership figure (such as the Reverend Jesse 
Jackson), nor an established central political congress (like the N.A.A.C.P.), 
through which to voice their concerns and desires. Consequently, people with 
disabilities were empowered with civil rights absent the necessary political tools 
and organization for inducing a general elevation of social consciousness. Thus it 
is not entirely surprising that popular opinions about people with disabilities 
conform neither to the spirit of the legislative findings of the statute nor to the letter 
of assertions made by disability rights advocates. 
105. See generally Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of 
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993); Richard K. Scotch, 
Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380 ( 1989); RlCHARD K. SCOTCH, 
FROM Goon WILL TO CNIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 111-16 (1984). An especially good 
personal treatment is HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, BLACK BIRD FLY AWAY: DISABLED IN AN ABLE-BODIED WORLD 
(1998). 
106. See SHAPIRO, supra note 96, at 184-210; Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal 
Empowerment of Americans With Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 247,255-59 (1994). 
107. A notable exception was the 1977 San Francisco sit-in to protest delay in promulgating Section 504's 
regulations. See SCOTCH, supra note I 04, at 111-16. 
108. See generally JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET (1989). 
109. See VICTORIA MEDGYESI, No MORE B.S.! A REALISTIC SURVNAL GUIDE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS 
(1992). 
110. See SHAPIRO, supra note 96, at 126. 
Ill. As noted at the time by ADA lobbyist Liz Savage, "[p]eople with epilepsy now will be advocates for the 
same piece of legislation as people who are deaf ... That has never happened before. And that's really historic." See 
SHAPIRO, supra note 96, at 126-27. 
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Compounding these difficulties is the lamentable reality that insufficient 
knowledge about the ADA has been disseminated to either the general public or to 
people with disabilities. For instance, most members of the public assume that an 
ADA-covered person has a condition that limits her mobility or senses, when in 
fact the average Title I claimant is a middle-aged woman with a muscular-skeletal 
injury, most frequently in her back. 112 Whether this should be the typical Title I 
plaintiff is a valid question, but it is secondary to the observation that lack of 
knowledge about the nature of ADA claimants results in resistance to their claims 
in both academia 113 and the popular media. 114 Finally, it is worth noting that, four 
years after the ADA's passage, one survey revealed that only forty percent of the 
disabled people interviewed had either read or heard about the ADA (and by 
implication Title I). 115 This problem is particularly acute among minorities with 
disabilities, wherein a knowledge gap corresponds to employment differentials 
within the disabled community. 116 This market failure to disseminate information 
among those most directly affected by the ADA speaks volumes to the issue of 
information asymmetry. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay I investigated the claim made by some proponents of law and 
economics analysis, that for an employer to express a rational preference for a 
worker with a disability over an equally qualified, or even a slightly less qualified, 
worker without a disability is virtually an oxymoron. Far from its being irrational 
for employers to suppress biases against hiring individuals who are disabled, errors 
that inflate the cost of doing so constitute a market failure that deters employers 
from reaching and executing rational decisions. It is this irrational failure of the 
market, rather than the imposition of irrational regulation, that has undercut the 
efficacy of Title I of the ADA. The conjectural deficiency of the neoclassical 
economic model reflects a more generalized failure: a society-wide absence of 
accurate information about the circumstances and capabilities of people with 
disabilities. The dearth of facts to inform the private determinations that constitute 
and are regulated by public nondiscrimination disability policy is due, in part, to a 
chronology unique to the disabled. The civil rights empowerment of individuals 
with disabilities preceded their collective political invigoration and, consequently, 
112. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Dispelling the Myths About Work Disability in 
APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE (Teny Thompson ed., 1998). 
113. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER & GUITY NASHAT BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF LIFE 20-22 (1997). 
114. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Underthe ADA, We May All Be Disabled, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1999, at A27. 
115. See Loms HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., SURVEY OF AMERICANS WlTII DISABILITIES 122 (1994) (conducted 
for the National Organization on Disability). 
116. See William J. Hanna & Elizabeth Rogovsky, On the Situation of African-American Women with Physical 
Disabilities, 23 J. APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELLING 39-45 (1992) (comparing the situation of the 25% of 
African-American women with disabilities who were fully employed with that of the 44% of white women, 57% of 
African-American men, and 77% of white men with disabilities who were fully employed). 
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occurred prior to educating the public about the realities, both historical and 
contemporary, of why protection from discrimination is needed. 
